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"The Rise and Demise of PATCO" Reconstructed 
IN his article "The Rise and Demise of P A T C O " (Nor thrup 1984), Herber t 
Northrup presents a narrow and mislead-
ing explanation of the ill-fated air traffic 
controllers' strike of 1981. Northrup's the-
sis is that the goal of the Professional Air 
Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) 
strike was to establish the right to bargain 
over wages within a private sector frame-
work. He attributes the failure of the strike 
to the union's inept leadership and praises 
the Reagan administration for its firm 
response to the challenge presented by 
PATCO. 
Although most of the facts he reports are 
accurate, Nor th rup omits crucial infor-
mation regarding the management style of 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
and the internal dynamics of PATCO. Based 
on this additional information, we will argue 
that PATCO'S primary goal was to address 
the work-related problems of the rank-and-
file specifically by reducing the work week 
and improving the retirement system; that 
the primary cause of the strike was rank-
and-file frustration with autocratic man-
agement; and that the Reagan administra-
tion joined forces with career FAA managers 
to destroy PATCO without giving sufficient 
consideration to less drastic alternatives. 
T h e PATCO Bargaining Objectives 
The weakest link in Northrup's analysis 
is his assertion that the basic objective of 
the 1981 PATCO strike was "wage deter-
mination on a private sector model" 
(Northrup 1984:171). This theme is sub-
ject to two possible interpretations. In its 
weaker version the goal of PATCO could 
have been to stretch federal labor relations 
law to the limit by bargaining over wages 
subject to Congressional approval. In its 
stronger version the goal of PATCO could 
have been to break away from the con-
straining civil service system by forcing the 
privatization of the FAA. PATCO could have 
attained the weaker form of private sector 
wage determination by ratifying the ten-
tative contract signed on June 22, 1981. As 
Northrup interprets the situation, the union 
stubbornly refused to be satisfied with this 
precedent-setting agreement and instead 
staged "the 'definitive strike' aimed at 
achieving PATCO'S basic aims of inducing 
Congress to establish an independent FAA, 
permitting wage bargaining, and legitim-
izing strikes" (Northrup 1984:174). 
To support his thesis that this stronger 
version of private sector wage bargaining 
was the objective, Northrup refers to five 
PATCO sources (Nor thrup 1984:17ln). 
Three of the five are not directly relevant 
to the 1981 negotiations because they pre-
date Robert Poli's ascendancy to the pres-
idency of the union. The remaining two 
sources are fatally flawed. The article 
"Maybe It's Time to Dismiss the FAA," which 
appeared in the New York Times on 
August 16, 1981, is credited to Robert Poli 
by Northrup when in fact it was written by 
Robert Poole, who has no association with 
PATCO. Poole is a long-time advocate of pri-
vatization of public services, and is clearly 
identified in an insert to the article as Pres-
ident of the Reason Foundation (Poole 
1981). The July 13, 1981, UPI article ref-
erenced by Northrup in support of his 
position in fact contradicts him quite clearly. 
When asked to comment on a proposal to 
establish a private company to provide air 
traffic control services, PATCO officials 
disavowed any association with the plan. In 
fact, PATCO'S eastern regional vice-president 
specifically disassociated the privatization 
proposal from the pending strike: "I'm sure 
we'll devote all our efforts to obtaining a 
new contract and realistically . . . we cannot 
rule out the possibility of a strike. So this 
[privatization] plan doesn't fit in at all under 
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the present circumstances" (UPI 1981:16). 
In addition to the five PATCO sources, 
Northrup refers to a bill, HB 1576, intro-
duced by Representative William Clay on 
PATCO's behalf in 1981. The Clay bill would 
have established a separate salary schedule 
for air traffic controllers, required the FAA 
to bargain over wages with the collective 
bargaining agent of the controllers, and 
provided for adjustment of the salary 
schedule to reflect any future collective 
bargaining agreement. The bill also 
included language that would have allowed 
the air traffic controllers to strike (U.S. 
House of Representatives 1981a). 
Certainly HB 1576 would have enabled 
PATCO to negotiate under private sector 
rules, as argued by Northrup. What North-
rup fails to report is that on July 30, 1981, 
Clay introduced a revised version of the 
legislation, HB 4332. The revised bill deleted 
the provision for automatic adjustment of the 
salary schedule subject to collective bargaining, 
and omitted the right to strike (U.S. House of 
Representatives 1981b). PATCO officials had 
agreed to these changes because they rec-
ognized that the bill stood no chance of 
serious consideration in its original form 
(Shostak and Skocik 1986, Chap. 5). The 
PATCO leaders most certainly would not 
have accepted such revisions four days 
before the strike if bargaining under pri-
vate sector rules had been their primary 
objective. 
Even when chastising the union for not 
accepting the weaker version of private sec-
tor bargaining, Northrup focuses on wages: 
"The willingness of the Reagan adminis-
tration to bargain over wages . . . brought 
PATCO close to its goal" (Nor thrup 
1984:183). This claim still misses the point. 
The publicly stated negotiating demands 
of PATCO indeed included a substantial 
wage increase. Besides inflicting consider-
able damage on the union's public image, 
the wage demands masked the key issues 
in the conflict. In five surveys conducted 
for the union by Drexel University sociol-
ogy professor Arthur Shostak during 1979, 
1980, and 1981, PATCO members consist-
ently reported that their primary concerns 
were (1) wage gains, (2) a shorter work-
week, and (3) an improved retirement plan 
(Shostak and Skocik 1986, Chap. 5). 
Although the wage package offered by the 
Reagan administration was not as large as 
PATCO had hoped, both President Poli and 
Chief Negotiator Dennis Reardon are firm 
in their position that the wage improve-
ment would have been acceptable had the 
contract also addressed the other two key 
issues (Poli 1985; Reardon 1985). In terms 
of narrow bargaining objectives, the prior-
ities at the time of the strike were to shorten 
the workweek and improve the retirement 
system (Leyden 1982; Maher 1985; Poli 
1985; Reardon 1985; Taylor 1985). 
In fact, the July 1981 UPl article refer-
enced by Northrup, although it did not sup-
port his thesis that PATCO's goal was to 
privatize its relations with the FAA. clearly 
reflected the true objectives of the union. 
The article reported that the contract faced 
likely rejection "by an overwhelming mar-
gin on the grounds that it does not 
address . . . [controllers'] main concerns— 
a shorter work week and better retirement 
benefits" (UPI 1981:16). By some accounts, 
the shorter workweek became the more 
important objective as the strike deadline 
approached. As Business Week summarized 
the situation, "Federal Aviation Association 
and union officials alike are now saying that 
the membership is homing in on the 
reduced work week issue" {Business Week 
1981:26). 
The Role of FAA Management 
A second flaw in Northrup's analysis is 
his omission of any careful evaluation of 
management 's role in the conflict. The 
reports of three groups of neutral outside 
experts, appointed by the Department of 
Transportation to assess the personnel dif-
ficulties of the FAA and to recommend solu-
tions, contain a wealth of information on 
management's contribution to the recur-
rent hostilities. Northrup briefly mentions 
these studies, concluding that the reports 
"criticized the FAA'S relations with its 
employees, although pointing out that 
PATCO leadership was heavily to blame" 
(Northrup 1984:168). As we read them, the 
reports document in detail the failings of 
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FAA management and make only second-
ary references to PATCO'S role. 
The Corson Committee was appointed 
after the PATCO job actions of 1968 and 
1969. Its report, issued in January 1970, 
documents a series of problems with work-
ing conditions and recommends numerous 
changes in management policies. It includes 
stinging criticisms of management, such as 
the following: 
[The] KAA cannot now command the full sup-
port of many members of the work force in its 
terminals and centers. Indeed, members of this 
committee have never previously observed a sit-
uation in which there is as much mutual resent-
ment and antagonism between management and 
its employees. (Corson 1970:97) 
It is true that the report also condemns 
PATCO'S tactics, but it places substantial 
blame for the poor relations on manage-
ment, decrying "the failure of FAA'S man-
agement at all levels to truly understand 
the role of the employee organizations" 
(Corson 1970:108). 
In 1973 the FAA commissioned a five-
year study of the effect of the occupation 
on the health of employees under the 
direction of Boston University psychiatrist 
Robert Rose. The 1978 Rose Report con-
cludes that air traffic controllers have an 
unusually high prevalence of hypertension 
and that job stress contributes to the psy-
chiatric problems experienced by nearly 
half of the controllers. It also confirms the 
existence of a burnout phenomenon, con-
cluding that "the period of maximum pro-
ductivity as a controller is a limited one, 
perhaps 10, 15, but not more than 20 years" 
(Rose 1978:16). The report ties the prob-
lem of hypertension, job stress, and burn-
out directly to the management practices 
of the FAA. In its conclusion, the report 
notes "dissatisfaction among a large enough 
group to warrant a review of management 
policies and practices" (Rose 1978:628). 
Following the PATCO strike, yet another 
task force was appointed. The Jones Report, 
issued in March 1982 and endorsed by all 
three members of the task force, provides 
direct evidence that the "para-military, 
heavy handed style" of FAA management 
contributed to the PATCO strike (Jones, 
Bowers, and Fuller 1982:10; Witkin 1982). 
The report describes the "rigid and insen-
sitive system of people management within 
the FAA" (Jones, Bowers, and Fuller 1982:1). 
It concludes that "the strike by air traffic 
controllers [is] consistent with what might 
have been expected—negative organiza-
tional conditions, treatment, and experi-
ences, not peer pressure, caused most 
individuals to decide to strike" (Jones, Bow-
ers, and Fuller 1982:68). 
It is our impression that Northrup fails 
to recognize the provocative role played by 
management because of his reliance on 
interviews with FAA officials as the basis for 
much of his analysis. The explanation of 
the strike offered by top FAA managers is 
reviewed in an article by David Bowers, a 
member of the Jones Task Force and a 
research scientist at the University of Mich-
igan Institute for Social Research. T h e 
management assessment parallels North-
rup's closely, FAA managers believed that 
the key concerns of PATCO were much 
higher pay and benefits, and Northrup 
argues that the key objective was wage bar-
gaining on a private sector model, FAA 
managers believed that PATCO had unreal-
istic expectations because of past FAA 
"indulgence" of the union's demands, and 
Northrup traces PATCO'S behavior to the 
"equivocal" response of the federal gov-
ernment to past job actions, FAA managers 
believed that most controllers struck 
because of peer pressure, and Northrup 
identifies Poli's "adherents in the field" as 
instigators "whipping up" strike support 
(Bowers 1983:6; Northrup 1984:167, 177, 
184). 
Bowers emphatically rejects the FAA top 
management version of what transpired, 
noting that "the findings [of the Jones task 
force] stand in almost polar opposition to 
the views obtained in interviews and con-
versations with a wide array of key man-
agers" (Bowers 1983:17). We also reject 
Northrup's version. Because he ignores the 
rigidity of FAA management, Nor thrup 
misses the catalyst role it played in the strike. 
The frustration of working controllers with 
their supervisors created a potentially 
explosive situation. 
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For its part, the FAA took a familiar man-
agement position. It blamed morale prob-
lems on PATCO and chose to ignore the 
evidence offered in the Corson and Rose 
reports. Rather than correcting manage-
ment inadequacies, the FAA prepared for 
what Raymond Van Vuren, Director of Air 
Traffic, described in 1980 as an "inevita-
ble" strike (BNA 1980:11). If the agency 
could weather the strike, PATCO would be 
destroyed and the problems would 
disappear.' 
Based on the information in the three 
consulting reports and the Bowers article, 
we conclude that FAA management never 
accepted PATCO as a legitimate represen-
tative of the air traffic controllers, and the 
union predictably responded with an 
aggressive, confrontational approach. The 
controllers' support for PATCO and its strat-
egies is best viewed as a reflection of man-
agement's failures. 
Internal Dynamics of PATCO 
A third weakness in Northrup's article is 
its lack of clarity regarding changes within 
PATCO that contributed to the events of 
1981.2 The unsavory work environment 
revealed in the task force reports enhanced 
PATCO'S standing with air traffic con-
trollers. Membership increased steadily in 
the years preceding the strike, peaking at 
nearly 94 percent of those eligible in the 
summer of 1981 (Spector and Beer 
1982:13). The union actually began inter-
nal strike preparation in the fall of 1978. 
In response to rank-and-file discontent with 
'Predictably, however, the problems did not go away. 
The Jones task force conducted a follow-up study in 
1984, and concluded that the FAA had not heeded the 
commission's earlier advice to institute humane labor 
management techniques. Instead, the FAA has devel-
oped a human relations program "viewed [by the con-
trollers] as inconsequential, as largely slogans and 
superficial window dressing" (Feaver 1984). 
Given his reliance on anonymous FAA sources for 
much of his information, it is not clear how Northrup 
developed his version of the internal dynamics of 
PATCO. We base most of this section and our prior 
discussion of the PATCO bargaining objectives on inter-
views with PATCO officials, some conducted in 1981 
and 1982 as part of a prior research project and the 
remainder conducted in 1985 as we prepared this 
piece. 
a three-year contract signed earlier that 
year, President John Leyden established a 
committee to begin planning for the next 
round of negotiations. Each of the seven 
regional vice-presidents selected a rank-
and-file leader (the seven original "choir 
boys") to be a member of the " '81 Com-
mittee," with Executive Vice-President 
Robert Poli representing the national office. 
Leyden asked the committee to plan a leg-
islative agenda, conduct a public relations 
campaign, and (as a last resort) prepare for 
a strike. To assure membership support in 
the event that a strike became necessary, a 
new policy was adopted requiring that 80 
percent of all air traffic controllers (or 
roughly 90 percent of PATCO members) vote 
in favor of any such action (Leyden 1982). 
After he ousted Leyden from the pres-
idency in January 1980 as described by 
Northrup, Poli allowed the '81 Committee 
to focus its attention more single-mindedly 
on the mechanics of strike preparat ion 
(Maher 1985). Once a strike plan was devel-
oped it was explained at regional PATCO 
meetings and in an April 1980 memo from 
Poli (Poli 1980). Additional choir boys were 
selected by the '81 Committee to imple-
ment the plan locally. Eventually, there was 
one choir boy at each facility, or over 400 
nationally. The choir boys were typically 
activists chosen for their ability to articulate 
positions and for their influence with the 
rank-and-file. Although a commitment to 
strike if necessary was required of each choir 
boy, PATCO officials insist that "non-violence 
was at all times primary and mandatory" 
(Maher 1984; Reardon 1985; Taylor 1985). 
Each choir boy was instructed by the '81 
Committee to organize seven local com-
mittees, with assignments ranging from 
picketing to family support. Most members 
of the union were assigned to a committee, 
ensuring the broadest possible participa-
tion in strike preparation (Poli 1980; Vacca 
1982; Maher 1985). The weakness in this 
system was the exclusive focus of the com-
mittees on strike preparation. The tight 
internal cohesiveness became so powerful 
that it developed a momentum of its own, 
increasing the likelihood of a strike. It also 
increased the confidence of PATCO'S lead-
ership that the controller work force would 
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strike if necessary (Reardon 1985; Taylor 
1985), contrary to Northrup's conclusion 
that the leaders "underestimated their abil-
ity to hold their members in line" (North-
rup 1984:184). 
As the contract expiration date 
approached, the influence of the '81 Com-
mittee and the choir boy system increased. 
Because of the unusually high degree of 
membership involvement, PATCO essen-
tially became captive to the controllers ' 
frustration with management. As Bowers 
has noted, the bargaining process was ill 
equipped to address the employee dissat-
isfaction with managerial behavior, and the 
demands were "projected onto 'harder ' 
economic issues" (Bowers 1983:8). When 
bargaining with the FAA broke down, and 
the support from President Reagan that 
Poli had anticipated failed to materialize, 
the '81 Committee's strike plan became the 
only viable option. The high degree of 
internal organization assured PATCO'S 
leaders of widespread member support for 
a strike. In fact, the momentum was so 
strong that aborting the strike would have 
been difficult. As former PATCO president 
Leyden cynically put it, "Disproportionate 
democracy led to a runaway ship" (Leyden 
1982). 
According to Nor thrup , the PATCO 
"script" called for Poli to accept the final 
offer of the Reagan administration in June, 
then have the executive board repudiate 
the offer and use it to whip up support for 
a strike. The supporting evidence provided 
is exceedingly thin, consisting of "call-in 
telephone recordings" and minutes from a 
local union meeting in Sacramento (North-
rup 1984: l75n). Northrup could provide 
us only with the meeting notes and a tape 
of a series of conversations between two 
controllers in Memphis and Indianapolis. 
The Sacramento meeting notes do not 
mention how PATCO intended to build strike 
support. They do, however, quote the choir 
boys conducting the meeting as stating, "If 
we get into the strike hall and come up 
short, . . . Mr. Poli will 'con' the media and 
will probably call an 11th hour settlement 
to try to 'save face.' " We can find no evi-
dence that this was national policy. Efforts 
to contact the choir boys who presided at 
this meeting to determine where they got 
this idea were unsuccessful. Dominic Tor-
chia, the vice-president of the western 
region in which the meeting occurred, sug-
gests, however, that an enthusiastic attempt 
to prepare the membership for a strike may 
have produced this speculative scenario 
(Torchia 1985). 
On the tape, controllers from two loca-
tions discuss how they intend to build sup-
port in their workplaces for a future strike 
vote and which locals need to increase strike 
commitment. Although their conversation 
takes place in July 1981, it contains only 
vague allusions to using the June 22 con-
tract to build strike support. 
In short, based on the information that 
Northrup provided us, it appears that he 
has linked together two isolated local 
sources, one referring to what would hap-
pen if the June 21 strike vote fell short of 
the required 80 percent, the other refer-
ring to building support for the August 3 
strike vote. But no logical connection exists. 
Interviews with national union officials, 
including Poli and several other negotiat-
ing committee members, suggest that the 
following very different series of events 
took place. After negotiations with the FAA 
broke down in late April, a June 22 strike 
deadline was announced, PATCO leaders 
believed that there was sufficient support 
for a strike. But when a strike vote con-
ducted under the auspices of the '81 Com-
mittee on the day before the deadline fell 
slightly short of the necessary 80 percent, 
the PATCO negotiating team was backed into 
a corner. Even though the final offer of 
Secretary Lewis did not address the key 
issues of a reduced workweek and improved 
ret irement system, it was accepted on 
June 22 by the negotiating team essentially 
because the team felt that it had no other 
option (Poli 1985; Maher 1985; Trick 1985; 
Reardon 1981; Reardon 1985; Taylor 
1985). 
Torchia, the western regional vice-
president and a member of the executive 
board, recalls, however, that by the time 
the full executive board met in Chicago in 
early July, widespread rank-and-file oppo-
sition to the contract had surfaced. Any 
executive board member who had voted to 
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support the contract might well have been 
forced by the members to resign (Torchia 
1985), which contributed to the board's 
recommendation that the contract be 
rejected by the members. Poli specifically 
denies the script described by Northrup, 
claiming that there was no contingency plan 
for the event the strike vote came up short 
("We weren't that smart"; Poli 1985). 
The Reagan Administration Strategy 
Northrup applauds the Reagan admin-
istration, which "unlike all its predeces-
sors . . . had the will when tested to meet 
the challenge" presented by PATCO (North-
rup 1984:183). We do not believe that the 
resolve is worthy of such unrestrained 
praise. Instead, we are convinced that the 
administration's actions actually contrib-
uted to the difficulty of reaching a nego-
tiated settlement. 
Although space limitations preclude a 
detailed review of the Reagan administra-
tion's negotiating tactics, even a brief sum-
mary reveals the underlying theme. Three 
particular actions exacerbated an already 
hostile collective bargaining environment. 
First, in February 1981 the Department of 
Transportation contracted with the law firm 
Morgan, Lewis, and Bockius to handle bar-
gaining with PATCO (at an eventual cost of 
$376,000) (Hershow 1982). This firm 
advocates a noncompromising approach to 
labor negotiations, and is known in labor 
circles as a "union buster" (AFL-CIO 1981, 
1983). Second, in March 1981 Reagan 
appointed J. Lynn Helms to head the FAA. 
While president of Piper Aircraft, Helms 
had developed a firm anti-union reputa-
tion (Reinhold 1981 :B9; Carley 1981:22). 
Finally, the six-week hiatus between the 
tentative contract agreement and the strike 
was used by the FAA to secretly revise and 
strengthen a strike contingency plan orig-
inally prepared and published under the 
Carter administration. Had the strike 
occurred on June 23, the Carter plan (with 
minor changes published early in the 
Reagan administration) would have been 
used. The revised plan implemented on 
August 3 was considerably less restrictive 
than the original. It permitted the airlines, 
in the event of a strike, to schedule more 
than twice as many flights as the Carter 
plan would have permitted. It also allowed 
the airlines to decide which flights should 
be canceled (FAA 1981; Meadows 1981; 
Richardson 1981). The revised plan was 
endorsed in advance of the strike by the 
major airlines and the Air Transport Asso-
ciation (Richardson 1980), but it was not 
divulged to PATCO officials (Young 1981). 
PATCO struck without knowing that the 
strike plan had been greatly changed. In 
an interview after the strike, PATCO's chief 
negotiator stated that prior knowledge of 
the revised plan would have given union 
negotiators pause and forced them to reev-
aluate their belief that a strike would vir-
tually paralyze the system (Reardon 1981). 
The ultimate step in Reagan's hard-line 
strategy was his decision to fire all striking 
air traffic controllers who did not return 
to their jobs within 48 hours of his back-
to-work ultimatum. Given the hostility felt 
by the striking controllers, and the union's 
lack of knowledge of the revisions in the 
FAA'S strike contingency plan, it is not sur-
prising that most PATCO members ignored 
the back-to-work ultimatum. Although 
Northrup's praise of this "determination to 
break with the past and to enforce the law" 
(Northrup 1984:184) may seem reasonable 
to some observers, we side with the labor 
relations experts who argue that less severe 
alternatives should have been pursued. 
John Dunlop accurately summarized this 
position in the week following the walkout: 
"The administration has decided . . . to 
leave no avenue of escape for the union. 
You just don' t do that . . . [Such an 
approach] is quite unusual, even going back 
to the turn of the century" (Taylor 
198LA1). 
The Reagan administration's tactics were 
clearly legal and perfectly acceptable if the 
goal was to severely weaken or eliminate 
PATCO. Our disagreement with Northrup 
on this point is essentially a difference of 
opinion. As an alternative to firing the con-
trollers, Dunlop suggested that some type 
of mediation could have been pursued 
beyond the pre-strike mediation by the 
FMCS. "What is absolutely without prece-
dent, at least in modern times, is that [the 
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Reagan administration] has brought in no 
outside, dispassionate group to look at the 
problem. Tha t ain't right" (Taylor 
1981.-A 1). 
Dunlop's position is similar to that taken 
by W.J. Usery, Jr., a former secretary of 
labor. Two weeks after the strike began, 
Usery publicly suggested that a panel of 
three former labor secretaries be assem-
bled to mediate a settlement (Eaton and 
Cimons 1981:1, 14; Los Angeles Times 1981). 
The Reagan administration, however, 
rejected all recommendations to seek 
mediation and remained firm in its firing 
decision. We believe that the collective bar-
gaining environment in the United States 
was harmed by this hard-line attitude, which 
encouraged anti-union managers in the 
public and private sectors to follow the 
president's example. 
Conclusion 
A complex set of circumstances contrib-
uted to PATCO'S ultimate decision to strike. 
Despite advice from independent task 
forces to revise management practices, the 
FAA persisted in its autocratic treatment of 
controllers. In response, PATCO became 
increasingly militant, and by 1981 the 
internal activities of the union were nar-
rowly focused on strike preparation. The 
hard line taken by the Reagan administra-
tion legitimized the stubbornness of FAA 
management and presented the challenge 
PATCO militants had been anticipating. With 
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this combination of factors, the strike was 
virtually inevitable. 
A different conclusion could have been 
reached. Had FAA management been more 
responsive to the concerns of its employees, 
the situation would not have deteriorated 
as it did and PATCO would not have been 
able to adopt so militant a posture. The 
strike could also have been averted had the 
Reagan administration addressed the con-
cerns of the controllers by seriously nego-
tiating over the issues of retirement and 
hours of work. On the other hand, PATCO 
might have emerged from the negotiations 
victorious, or at least survived the strike, 
with a better strategy. Although the union's 
internal organizing efforts were extensive 
and effective, its external relations were 
largely ignored: coordination with other 
unions was not pursued, public relations 
were poor, and political activities were 
misguided. 
Northrup's analysis closely resembles the 
myopic assessment of the strike offered by 
career FAA managers. As such, it misses the 
flaws in management and the internal 
dynamics of PATCO. We believe that the 
information we have presented fills in the 
gaps in his analysis and completes the pic-
ture of this complex, precedent-sett ing 
confrontation. 
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Reply 
THE thesis of my article, "The Rise and Demise of PATCO,"1 was clearly stated 
in the first paragraph: 
T h e strike was the inevitable result of PATCO'S 
long- term drive to "privatize" its relations with 
'Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 
(January 1984), pp. 167-84 (hereafter cited as "PATCO 
article"). 
the Federal Aviation Adminis t ra t ion (FAA) , its 
public sector employer ; of the weak response 
thereto by the federal government until the later 
years of the Car te r adminis t ra t ion; a n d of the 
failure of PATCO'S new leadersh ip to u n d e r s t a n d 
the greatly a l tered political a n d economic envi-
r o n m e n t of 1981." 
2Ibid., 167. 
